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This paper focuses on the role of governments in contemporary networked 
political configurations. Such networks constitute policy communities, usually 
based upon shared conceptions of social problems and their solutions. By 
enabling social, political and economic connections at local, regional, national 
and international levels, such networks become key policy players as well as a 
policy technology in different spaces. More specifically, the paper is organised 
around three policy frameworks in the field of education. Each framework is 
based on a ‘network-case’. In the first framework, governments represent the 
main driver for political change in legislating a landscape that creates the 
conditions for networks to develop around different aspects within the public 
sphere (e.g. organisation, co-funding, delivery, etc.). The second policy 
framework focuses on the activities of an already organised network in order to 
engage with existing political configurations as a “political actor” in its own right, 
what could be called “governing with/alongside networks”. The third policy 
framework focuses on instances where the network operates directly as a “state-
maker”.  
 







Since Bill Gates’ speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2008, there 
have been a myriad of academic papers, newspaper articles, social media entries, 
open letters from professional bodies, and even parliamentary debates and 
political programmes, celebrating and developing further the ideas expressed by 
the then third richest man in the world. As discussed in previous papers (Ball & 
Olmedo, 2012; Olmedo, 2013, 2016), what Gates called creative capitalism has 
generated Adler and Hass (1992) identified as an ‘epistemic community’. Just to 
reiterate once more, Gates’ creative capitalism is based on the belief that: 
 
The genius of capitalism lies in its ability to make self-interest serve the 
wider interest. (…) But to harness this power so it benefits everyone, we 
need to refine the system. (…) Such system would have a twin mission: 
making profits and also improving lives for those who don’t fully benefit 
from market forces. To make the system sustainable, we need to use 
profit incentives whenever you can. (…) The challenge is to design a 
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system where market incentives, including profits and recognition, drive 
the change. (…) I like to call this new system creative capitalism – an 
approach where governments, businesses, and nonprofits work together 
to stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a 
profit, or gain recognition, doing work that eases the world’s inequities.1 
 
Within such epistemic communities, also identified as ‘communities of practice’ 
in the sociological literature (see Callon & Latour, 1981) or ‘knowledge 
networks’ in management studies (Uzzi, 1996), a de-limited set of models and 
ideas circulate that facilitate the creation of new policy discourses and 
technologies, which in some cases contribute to the transformation of the 
structures and procedures of government. Nevertheless, such communities ‘are 
not in the business of controlling societies; what they control are international 
problems. Their approach is instrumental, and their life is limited to the time and 
space defined by the problem and its solutions. Epistemic communities are 
neither philosophers, nor kings, nor philosopherkings’ (Adler & Haas, 1992, p. 
371). It would be a mistake to infer that the set of specific outcomes and results 
of processes of policy enactment linked to such ideas are a direct consequence of 
the operations of one specific epistemic community. There are a number of 
historically and geographically situated contingencies, external and internal 
constrains, public and private interests, political and economic pressures, etc., 
that are in operation and that introduce a level of uncertainty, specificity, and 
complexity to such policy processes. Nevertheless, the logic of creative 
capitalism has quickly penetrated the political discourse and inspired new ways 
of doing policy. As shown below, governments from both the Global North and 
Global South, are embracing Gate’s message and politicians seem to have found a 
new silver bullet that is recurrently brought into play to justify and strengthen 
the need for reform. As Glaeser (2010, p. 48) suggests, the case for creative 
capitalism is based both on the failure of markets, as they seem to have 
contributed to the ever increasing levels of social inequality, and the ‘the failure 
of government’ which, in his opinion, ‘have failed dismally’ in their 
responsibilities to public health care and education. Running through the 
capillary system that sustains Cameron’s English Big Society or the more recent 
Musseveni’s Ugandan National Development Plan, the need to repopulate the 
state and, more concretely, to restructure the provision of public services 
through the participation of actors from the private sector (businesses, 
philanthrocapitalists, social entrepreneurs, etc.) is portrayed as the only way 
forward in order to modernise the old and decaying welfare state system.  
 
However, Gates’ ideas are certainly not new. Since the 1980s, a series of 
researchers in the fields of political science (Rhodes, 1988; Rhodes & Marsh, 
1992) and sociology of organisations (Powell, 1990; Wellman, 1988) have 
studied the development of networks as a response to the inadequacy of markets 
and hierarchies. Their aim was to explain contemporary economies and political 
configurations, and show how both, markets and hierarchies, are not formed by 
atomistic players operating in isolation but rather are formed by and involved in 
                                                        




a matrix of relationships within and across sectors. Since then, the interest in 
policy networks has risen exponentially both within and across different 
disciplines. Yet, as Börzel (1997, p. 1) synthesises, ‘neither is there a common 
understanding of what a policy network actually is, nor has it been agreed upon 
whether policy networks constitute a mere metaphor, an analytical tool or a 
proper theory’. At a very general level, policy networks could be defined as ‘webs 
of relatively stable and ongoing relationships which mobilise and pool dispersed 
resources so that collective (or parallel) action can be orchestrated toward the 
solution of a common policy’ (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 36). However, such a 
definition fails to consider the nature, use and explanatory power of policy 
networks. Rhodes began his analysis on the configuration and functioning of the 
British government with the aim of establishing ‘the validity of networks of 
organisations as the most revealing unit of analysis’ (1988, p. 4, stress on 
original) and, developing the idea further, Mayntz suggests  that ‘the notion of 
“policy networks” does not so much represent a new analytical perspective but 
rather signals a real change in the structure of the polity’ (1993, p. 5). According 
to the latter, policy networks should be understood as a new form of governance 
that implies not only structural changes and the creation of new institutions and 
organisations, but also the transformation of the nature and roles of existing 
policy actors, and the creation of new methods of doing policy.  
 
The approach in this paper concurs with Dickens and his colleagues’ exercise 
which aims to reconcile both epistemological positions. They propose a 
‘relational view of networks as a methodology’ where ‘networks are neither 
purely organizational forms nor structures’. According to them, ‘networks are 
essentially relational processes, which, when realised empirically within distinct 
time- and space-specific contexts, produce observable patterns in the global 
economy’ (Dicken, Kelly, Olds, & Wai-Chung Yeung, 2001, p. 91, stress on 
original). In what follows, I will try to show how such observable patterns and 
structural changes can be found not only at the macro-level, but also modify the 
common, everyday practices and forms of organisation of policy actors “on the 
ground”. I do not intend to support the existence of different territorial levels in 
which policy practices operate, but, on the contrary, show how such artificial 
division into levels (e.g. global-local, international-national-regional, macro-
meso-micro, etc.) is not sufficient in order to understand the capillary 
organisation of power relations and structures across 21st century society(ies). 
In this sense, my analysis will interrogate and extend what Sassen calls 
processes of ‘denationalization of sovereignty’, that is the ways in which ‘certain 
components of sovereignty have under current conditions been relocated to 
supra- and subnational institutions, both governmental and non-governmental 
institutions, and both old and newly formed institutions’ (Sassen, 2000, p. 373). 
However, as Dicken et al. suggest, ‘it is insufficient to focus exclusively on 
organizations and institutions in order to understand global changes. We also 
need to examine the intentionality and power relations among social actors in 
these organizations and institutions’ (2001, pp. 92-93). Echoing this final claim, 
my research agenda for the past five years has focused on analyses of networks 
formations in different areas of education policy (see, for instance, Ball, 2012; 
Ball & Junemann, 2012; Olmedo, 2013). Such research efforts have aimed to face 
the challenge posed by Börzel (1997), to develop an approach to policy network 
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analysis that is able to offer more than just a useful toolbox in order to analyse 
contemporary policy-making. As she points out, there is a need to show that 
‘policy networks do not only exist but are also relevant for policy processes and 
policy outcomes’ (1997, p. 2). Alongside, she also advocates the need to tackle 
‘the problem of the ambiguity’ of policy network analysis if we are to show how 
‘policy networks can both enhance and reduce the efficiency and legitimacy of 
policy-making’ (idem). This entails an effort to track the flows of policies 
between and within different nation-states, but also to describe and analyse 
different network configurations and policy settings within and across such 
borders that suggest the need to redraw the traditional geographical maps that 
we are used to working with. In this paper, I will go back to previously gathered 
network databases and raise a number of questions about the new roles of 
government in three policy frameworks identified ad hoc. Each is based on a 
‘network-case’, that is an assemblage of organisations and programmes which 
activate new ‘methods’ of policy and financial exchanges (e.g. venture 
philanthropy and venture capital, social enterprise and microfinance, and social 
capitalism). Moreover, each one is based on a different geographical context 
though they should be understood as working in connection to each other. 
Philanthropists operating schools both at “home” and abroad; governmental 
international development agencies promoting and experimenting with new 
solutions in other countries; foreign companies hired by governments to develop 
new programmes and areas within the public education sector; venture 
investment funds buying and selling edu-businesses across national borders. etc. 
In order to begin to sketch a picture of education policy in the Global South, there 
is a need to make references to an endless list of programmes and individuals, 
companies, charities, philanthropies, foundations, etc.  based (or, maybe better, 
registered) in countries all over the world. Such picture will portray the “how”(s) 
of network governance, by showing the ways in which they interrelate and 
interact with each other; and the new “policy solutions” to educational problems 
that are being enacted across the globe.  The empirical evidence in each case will 
be indicative but not exhaustive, given the constant iteration of the processes 
involved and the high speed at which such changes take place.  
 
Policy framework 1: networks as policy technology 
 
The first framework identified in the analysis of political settings where 
networks operate relates to configurations where governments represent the 
main driver for political change in legislating a landscape that creates the 
conditions for networks to develop around different aspects within the public 
sphere (e.g. organisation, co-funding, delivery, etc.) (see Diagram 1). The 
network-case for this framework focuses on the re-launched Academies 
programme (see Gunter, 2011) and the newly created Free Schools scheme in 
England (Higham, 2014).  
 
[Insert Diagram 1 around here] 
 
Both programmes are situated very broadly under the political umbrella of what 
David Cameron, the UK conservative prime minister, baptised as the ‘Big Society’ 
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in his inaugural speech back in 20102. The Big Society shares the rationale of 
Gate’s creative capitalism. Based on a rhetoric empowerment of local 
communities, businesses and individuals, the Big Society implies a devolution of 
power from central government to local associations, charities, non-profit and 
for-profit social enterprises, which will be from now on the main actors of local 
and national policymaking and policy accountability. This new initiative is a good 
example of what Rose (1996: 56) defined as ‘a new pluralisation of “social” 
technologies’ based on strategies of diversification and decentralisation. In a 
second speech in the House of Commons a year later, David Cameron openly 
defended this new ‘duty’ of the government within an increasingly plural 
“networked-state”: 
 
(…) what we are talking about here is a whole stream of things that need 
to be done. First of all, we have got to devolve more power to local 
government, and beyond local government, so people can actually do 
more and take more power. Secondly, we have got to open up public 
services, make them less monolithic, say to people: if you want to start up 
new schools, you can; if you want to set up a co-op or a mutual within the 
health service, if you’re part of the health service, you can (…) I don’t 
believe that you just sort of roll back the state and the Big Society springs 
up miraculously. There are amazing people in our country, who are 
establishing great community organisations and social enterprises, but 
we, the government, should also be catalysing and agitating and trying to 
help build the Big Society.3 
 
Within the Big Society, the role of the government is based on its ability and 
capacity to set up new rules for partnerships, to facilitate and steer exchanges 
and control the movements and transactions within the networks. The processes 
involved here are not entirely what Rhodes (1996) identified as ‘governing 
without government’. On the contrary, this new mode of governance offers new 
techniques and technologies of governing to governments, in the form of what 
Jessop calls meta-governance and meta-heterarchy, that is ‘the organisation of 
the conditions of self-organisation by redefining the framework for heterarchy 
or reflexive organisation’ (2002, p. 241). Far from a ‘roll-back’ (Peck & Tickell, 
2002) or a total ‘hollowing out’ (Rhodes, 1994) of  the state, this new model 
implies a “roll-out” of government, based on the creation of new structures and 
technologies of governance that would redefine its roles and responsibilities but, 
at the same time, would resituate it strategically both in normative and 
institutional terms. 
 
According to this new fashion, the model of funding and provision of education at 
primary and secondary levels under the Academies and Free Schools 
programmes in England moves away from an uniform schemes of co-ordination 
while not developing a pure market-based model. What is of interest to us here is 
the fact that it is the government who takes the initiative and introduces new 
forms of understanding and delivering public policy, using the network as a 
                                                        
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/big-society-speech  
3 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-on-big-society  
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policy technology (see Ball, 2007). Following the European tradition, here the 
network is understood as a new form of governance based on what Morgan-
Trimmer (2010) calls ‘governing through networks’. In fact, the resulting picture 
is formed by more flexible structures (heterarchies) where relationships, 
responsibilities and processes of decision-making are shared in different 
instances by a heterogeneous group of old and new actors with different 
backgrounds, profiles and interests (Jessop, 1998). Far from simply implying a 
technical change in legislative plans, this programme is facilitating the creation 
of new forms of hybrid and interconnected ensembles through which 
philanthropic institutions, non-profit venture funds and businesses join forces to 
compete with traditional public and private education providers (Hatcher, 
2011). As of August 2015, the DfE recognised 4762 Academies and Free Schools4, 
which are sponsored by 759 organisations5. Some of them are single schools but, 
during the last few years, there has been an increase in the number of chains of 
schools (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Top-15 Academy sponsors (in terms of number of schools) 
 
Academies Enterprise Trust (AET) 67 
School Partnership Trust Academies (SPTA) 43 
Oasis Community Learning 42 
Kemnal Academy Trust, The (TKAT) 41 
REAch2 40 
United Learning 40 
Plymouth CAST 35 
ARK Schools 34 
David Ross Education Trust (DRET) 33 
Ormiston Academies Trust 29 
Harris Federation 28 
Archdiocese of Birmingham 25 
Greenwood Dale Foundation Trust 25 
E-ACT 23 
Askel Veur - Diocese of Truro 22 
Source: DfE (updated Sept 20156) 
 
 
Following a fractal fashion, these chains of schools are the result of networks 
themselves. For instance, Ark Schools runs a chain of 34 academies in England7 
(plus 3 more that are in development8). On top of the funding received by the 
Department for Education (DfE), the charitable company rests on the support of 
a dense network of individuals, public institutions, other philanthropic 
                                                        
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-academies-and-academy-projects-in-
development#history  
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academy-sponsor-contact-list  
6 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-academies-and-academy-projects-in-
development#history  
7 http://arkonline.org/our-schools  
8 http://arkonline.org/our-uk-schools/schools-development  
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organisations and private businesses (see Network 1). ARK is currently 
registered as a company limited by guarantee with charitable status in the UK. In 
essence, such charitable companies are entitled to own property and generate 
profit, while still remaining liable for their own debts (though this applies to the 
charity and not its directors, who in this case should be also the trustees, and its 
members). Such economic surplus, generated from the provision of the services 
that they provide, should be “reinvested” within their own activities, however 
this does not exclude the alternative possibility of using their economic assets, at 
their own discretion, in order to trade and purchase certain services and goods 
with other public and private providers.  
 
ARK does not only run schools but are also involved in a number of other 
enterprises both in the UK and abroad (for instance in Uganda, see policy 
framework 3), taking with it, as it network expands, new sensibilities of enacting 
policy and the methods associated with it into new geographies  (see Olmedo, 
2013, 2016). 
 
[Insert Network 1 around here] 
 
The level of complexity in terms of managing such a diverse and expanding 
network of school providers (and their sub-networks) implies a change in the 
rationale of governmental practices. In fact, the focus of heterarchical 
governance is not based on the control of every single step of the delivery 
process but to operate over the context and conditions in which these systems 
function. The aim is to strategically influence others’ agendas and internal 
processes of decision making, while avoiding the need to become directly 
involved in their “raw operations”. This is what Rose and Miller (1992) identified 
as processes of ‘governing at a distance’, which encompass attempts of 
continuous dialogue and the creation of alliances between political and other 
actors from different fields. The role of government, therefore, moves towards 
what could be understood as ‘the monitoring state’, which ‘declines to offer 
solutions to particular problems but defines those problems, or “societal 
challenges”, for which solutions must be sought’ (Hodgson, 2012, p. 539). This 
implies, on the one hand, a focus on creating the conditions for new school 
providers to enter the system and, then, facilitating and overseeing such 
relationships within the network. As Besussi (2006) suggests, the main concern 
at this stage is not a lack of control on the side of government but a lack of 
interest of uncooperative providers. To solve that potential problem, the English 
government granted a contract to a charitable organisation, the New Schools 
Network, whose stated aim is ‘to improve the quality of education – particularly 
for the most deprived – by increasing the number of independent, innovative 
schools within the state sector’9. The charity was founded in 2009 by Rachel 
Wolf10, a former advisor to Michael Gove (then the Secretary of State for 
Education), who started campaigning to expand the academies/free schools 
                                                        
9 http://www.newschoolsnetwork.org/about-us  
10 Ms Wolf left the charity in 2013 and started working for Amplify, an education technology 
company based in the US. She has recently come back to the UK in 2015 to work for the 
Department for Education under the current conservative government.  
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programme after her experience in New York, where she had studied the 
operations of a number of charter schools.  
 
On the other hand, it is important to highlight that the focus here is on the 
network and the range of relationships themselves, while individual players 
might not be the most important factor. It could be argued that even though 
single providers can be “replaced”, there is a need to keep the network 
environment and connections alive. There are a number of situations that 
exemplify this new facet of government. In an interview to the TES back in 
201111, Sir Bruce Liddintong, then director general of the E-ACT multi-academy 
trust and former schools commissioner at the DfE, stated that the expectations 
for the trust was to expand from 11 to 250 schools by 2016. However, the 
company was already involved in a number of controversies. In 2013 and 2014, a 
series of investigations by the Education Funding Agency produced negative 
reports and raised important concerns about the lack of clarity, weak internal 
financial control systems and control over expenses for trustees, further 
‘extravagant expenses’ and irregularities in the use of financial assets12 by the 
multi-academy chain. Later, in 2014, E-ACT was running 34 state-funded schools 
when, following a series of Ofsted inspections13 to 16 of them, the inspectors 
concluded that: 
 
• eleven academies were failing to provide a ‘good’ education; including 
five that were judged to require ‘special measures’ 
• ten academies had not improved since their previous inspection (either as 
an academy or as the predecessor school). Of these, six academies had 
declined in terms of their Ofsted grade (two had been sponsored by E-
ACT for four years or more) 
• four academies were judged to be ‘good’ and one was judged 
‘outstanding’.14 
 
As a result, E-ACT then decided to relinquish 10 of their academies and hand 
them back to the DfE. The reaction from the government was swift and Michael 
Gove, then Secretary for Education, instead of converting the failing schools back 
into local-comprehensive schools under the control of their local authorities, 
commenced a search for new sponsors within the academies framework. The 
role of the government here focussed on avoiding the collapse of the network, 
what Schrank and Whitford (2011) identify as ‘network failure’. Such failure 
could be materialised, as suggested earlier, in the form of lack of interest on the 
                                                        
11 https://www.tes.com/article.aspx?storycode=6073399  
12 Sir Liddington was forced to resign after the controversy generated by the first of those reports 
and, also, the on-going pressures on him since E-ACT public accounts revealed that the general-
director received a salary of £280,816 in 2010/11, plus £18,303 for his pension and £16,707 in 
expenses. 
13 It is important to remember at this point that the inspectorate evaluates individual schools but 
not the groups and chains behind them.  







side of the provision, but also through the creation of processes of 
monopolisation of the network by a small number of providers, by negligent 
practices, and/or the development of dynamics of unfair competition within the 
networks. All those could potentially translate into deep power imbalances that 
would risk the government’s role as network leader and its steering capacity 
given the size and reach of over-grown providers, or, consequently, result in a 
lack of trust dynamics that could spoil the relationships amongst the multiple 
providers within the network and/or the members of the broader policy 
community (see Wright, 1988) around the Academies and Free Schools 
programmes. 
 
Policy framework 2: network as a policy actor 
 
The second policy framework is based on the activities of existing networks that 
engage with existing political configurations as a “political actors” in their own 
right (see Diagram 2). The network-case in this framework focuses on the 
activities of the Teach For All (TfA) Network in Europe. In fact, the nature and 
configuration of the European Union itself constitute a very favourable breeding 
ground for the operation of such networked enterprises. As Börzel suggests in 
her analysis of European governance, ‘the European Union then is 
conceptualised as a multi-level system of governance, where private and public 
actors of the supranational, national and subnational level interact within highly 
complex networks to produce policy outcomes’ (Börzel, 1997, p. 11).  
 
[Insert Diagram 2 around here] 
 
TfA is a network of social enterprises that is reshaping the definition of 
education and what it means to be a teacher through the development of a new 
model of teacher training. TFA operates at different scales and rhythms across 
the world and ‘incorporates multiple scales of economic (along with political, 
cultural and social) relations’ (Dicken et al., 2001, p. 90). The TFA network 
currently operates in 37 countries, with a significant presence within the 
European Higher Education Space (EHES) (13 of its members are located within 
the EU). Even though TFA members are independent and encouraged to embed 
themselves sensitively within their own local and national contexts, it is 
precisely their networked configuration that helps them learn and benefit from 
their connections with each other. A discursive, cultural and epistemological 
suture holds these different enterprises together, enabling TFA to describe itself 
as a ‘global movement’ of educational reform and ‘The Global Network for 
Expanding Educational Opportunity’15. A closer look at the funding scheme of 
TfA and the individual cases shows similarities with the previous example. A 
number of inter/national banks (ie. HSBC, ICICI, Deutsche Bank), international 
consultancy firms (ie. McKinsey, Goldman Sachs), and retail companies (ie. Tata, 
Sainsbury’s) are engaged with the network (see Network 2) in diferent ways.  
 
[Insert Network 2 around here] 
 
                                                        
15 http://teachforall.org/en  
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As analysed in previous work (see Bailey, 2015; Olmedo, Bailey, & Ball, 2013), 
the private companies involved in the programme benefit directly and/or 
indirectly in multiple ways. For instance, the German subsidiary, Teach First 
Deutschland, runs the so-called ‘Teach First – join later’ scheme. The following 
extract from their website exemplifies the motivations for McKinsey & Co. in this 
case to partner with the charitable company: 
 
McKinsey & Company 
In addition to your application at Teach First Deutschland, you are 
applying at McKinsey & Company for the position of Junior Fellow, Fellow 
or Associate under bewerbung.mckinsey.de. There, under ‘Fill in 
application’ you choose the option ‘teach-first – join later’. Subsequently, 
both application procedures at Teach First Germany and McKinsey & 
Company will run parallel. If you are successful in both of them, you will 
receive an offer to start on condition that you first successfully complete 
the two year fellowship at Teach First Germany.16 
 
This type of “deferred entry” scheme constitutes a source of economic profit for 
the private companies involved. Through them, such corporate partners 
guarantee a high level of training and capacitation as well as valuable skills and 
qualifications prior to employment. As suggested before, ‘there is a capitalisation 
on and a commodification of the Teach For All participant here. They have an 
attributed commercial value (in human capital) which is not only “proven” but 
apparently ‘enhanced’ through the completion of the programme’ (Olmedo et al., 
2013, p. 505) . 
 
A strong financial and political support from national governments is also 
observed. In England, for instance, Teach First is funded mainly by the UK 
government. According to the charitable enterprise’s 2013-14 Trustees Annual 
Report and Accounts17, compared to the £6.6m received from “Corporate, trusts 
and other contributions” plus “Donations in kind”, Teach First receives £12.4m 
from “Government grants” (which covers the yearly grant paid by the 
government per trainee), £22.9m from their “Initial Teacher Training Contract” 
(a contract that the charity’s subsidiary, Teach First Initial Teacher Development, 
has secured with the National College for Teaching and Leadership, an UK 
government’s executive agency), and £8.1m from “Fees paid by schools”.  In 2014, 
Teach First recruited 1,426 trainees in addition to the 1,066 that continued from 
the previous year.  
 
However, what is of interest for the aim of this paper is not only the fact that the 
network is supporting governments by training teachers on their behalf, but also 
the fact that the ideas and solutions offered by the network are putting into 
question and transforming existing political schemes and programmes in the 
public realm. As an example, the Teach First model served as the basis for the 
                                                        
16 http://www.teachfirst.de/teachfirstjoinlater  






new initial teacher-training scheme in England (Schools Direct) launched by the 
conservative government in 201218. Such movement of ideas does not happen 
serendipitously or in a vacuum (see Network 3). On the contrary, it is the effect 
of the prolonged efforts and influences exerted within and across policy 
networks (see, for instance, Ball, 2007; Ball & Junemann, 2012; Olmedo, 2012). 
In our case, for instance, Lord Andrew Adonis is one of Teach First’s founding 
ambassadors. Member of the Labour Party from 1995 until 2015, he was 
Secretary of State for Transport, Minister for Schools, Head of the No.10 Policy 
Unit, and senior No. 10 adviser on education, public services and constitutional 
reform. While in government, he was the political architect of the initial 
Academies programme (see Policy Framework 1) amongst other reforms of key 
public services. More recently, Sam Freeman, a former senior policy adviser to 
Michael Gove when the latter was UK Secretary of State for Education, joined 
Teach First in 2013 as Director of Research, Evaluation and Impact and is 
currently the Executive Director of Programmes at Teach First. He also sits on 
the board of Floreat Education, an Academy sponsor that runs 5 schools in 
London (once again, it is worth noting the overlaps with Policy Framework 1). 
The list of connections with government bodies, private companies and other 
philanthropic organisations is extensive across Teach First’s board of trustees, 
executive and senior leadership teams, ambassadors, etc.  
 
[Insert Network 3 around here] 
 
The model nurtured by the TfA network implies an alternative to “traditional” 
forms of teacher training, also, puts pressure on national governments across 
Europe and all over the world who are compelled to modify existing regulation 
to order to make room and accommodate the new initiative. This new mode of 
governance relates to what could be called “governing with/alongside 
networks”. Here, unlike the previous case, the network is not the effect of 
governmental action but an external player that will collaborate and/or compete 
with traditional policy actors. By doing so, the network is contributing directly to 
changes in the roles of such actors (government departments, political parties, 
unions, universities, schools, etc.) who respond by developing strategies and 
policy technologies that incorporate and/or resist the influence exerted by such 
external networked policy formations. Despite its Occidental roots, Teach for All 
has expanded rapidly and is currently operating in 38 countries around the 
world including Central and Latin America (Haiti, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Chile Argentina, Uruguay); Africa (Ghana); and Asia/Pacific (Lebanon, 
Israel, Qatar, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, China, 
Japan). There is a growing interest within the academic community and a 
number of scholars have begun to analyse the impact of the TfA network in these 
contexts. However, more research is needed in order to understand its effects ‘on 
the ground’ and the new resultant changes in the models of governance in each 
one of those cases.  
 
Policy framework 3: network as state-maker 
 
                                                        
18 Research interview conducted with the Head of Research at Teach First.  
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Finally, the third policy framework identified focuses on instances where 
network configurations operate directly as a ‘state-maker’. This is more common, 
though not exclusively, in late-developing countries defined by a nascent public-
service system and/or unregulated political spheres, where there is an urgent 
need to construct political structures, configure new roles, determine and assign 
responsibilities, etc (see Diagram 3). The network-case in this framework will 
focus on the development of the Ugandan Universal Secondary Education (USE) 
programme.  
 
[Insert Diagram 3 around here] 
 
During the last decade, the overall growth in population in Uganda, alongside the 
rise in the number of students completing Primary Education (as a result of the 
enactment of the free Universal Primary Education programme), are generating 
strong difficulties for the government to attend to the increasing demands for 
school placements at Secondary levels. Such pressures are experienced not only 
in the field of education but also in other sectors of the Ugandan public services. 
To tackle the situation, in 2010 the government announced a new strategic 
framework, the National Development Plan (NDP), with a clear vision: ‘a 
transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous 
country within 30 years’19. To do so, the government is openly committed to 
allowing private investment and participation to play a more significant role in 
the modernisation of the country. On the Foreword of the NDP document, 
President Museveni stated: ‘I urge the private sector, civil society and academia 
to work together with Government and to align their development efforts 
towards achieving the NDP objectives and the country's Vision’20. In the same 
line, a review of the Ugandan NDP prepared by the International Development 
Association (IDA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlights: 
 
The NDP broadens the strategic focus of the authorities from `poverty 
reduction' to `structural transformation' in order to raise growth and 
living standards. In recent years, the authorities' policies have 
increasingly targeted a rise in potential growth and reduction in income 
poverty. Building on the achievements under the PEAP, the NDP aims at 
fostering skilled employment growth and a sectoral shift to higher value-
added activities. It gives the government a strategic role in this process by 
eliminating remaining, persistent barriers to growth and promoting 
private sector involvement in selected priority areas. The NDP identifies 
four priority targets: human resources development through health, 
education and skills building; boosting up physical infrastructure, 
particularly in the energy and transportation areas; supporting science, 
technology and innovation; and facilitating private access to critical 
production inputs, particularly in agriculture.21 
 
In the field of education, the new landscape sketched in the NDP added to 
existing pressures at the time for the country to meet the Education For All 
                                                        
19 http://npa.ug/development-plans/ndp-201011-201415/  
20 Idem.  
21 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10142.pdf  
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(EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG). As a response, the Ugandan 
Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) launched the Universal Secondary 
Education programme in 2007. The scheme is part of the broader Universal Post 
Primary Education and Training (UPPET) program and follows the Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs) model. As Verger (2012, p. 110) suggests, PPPs are 
‘programmatic ideas’, that is ‘technical ideas that provide the interpretation of a 
policy problem and its causes and prescribe a precise course of policy action to 
solve the problem’. In short, PPPs are an “umbrella notion” that covers different 
contractual arrangements between the private and civil society organisations 
and public institutions in order to provide and/or operate infrastructure and/or 
deliver public services (see Education International, 2009; Patrinos, Barrera-
Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009). According to its advocates, the PPPs programme will 
help ‘maximize the potential for expanding equitable access to schooling and for 
improving education outcomes, especially for marginalized groups’ (Patrinos et 
al., 2009, p. 9). However, critics have raised the concern that, in some cases, the 
use of PPPs is a cover-up for form of ‘hidden privatization’, where the ‘word 
“partnership” is being used to render “privatization” more palatable to public 
opinion’ (Education International, 2009, p. 147).  
 
The PPP solution that conforms the basis for the Ugandan USE programme is 
different from other more familiar schemes (Brans, 2011). In this case, the 
government pays a fixed per-capita fee directly to private secondary schools that 
are situated in sub-counties that are not served by government-aided or public 
schools. To be eligible, private schools must meet a set of criteria and quality 
benchmarks: (i) being registered with the MoES, (ii) have adequate 
infrastructure, (iii) show demonstrated support from locally elected officials and 
education officials, (iv) institute a board of governors with government and 
parental membership and (v) have sufficient certified teaching staff (Barrera-
Osorio, de Galbert, & Sabarwal, 2015, p. 4). However, the specific terms of each 
contract are included in a Memorandum of Understanding that is signed between 
the government and the individual private school operator. As a result, as Brans’ 
research shows, in the Ugandan case ‘the policy environments where the PPPs 
are discussed are characterized by non-transparency, lack of dissension and 
decreasing space for civil society engagement’ (2011, p. 48). 
 
The World Bank is one of the main promoters of the PPP programme in Uganda, 
both economically and in terms of political advocacy and consultancy (see 
Network 4). In fact, since the launch of the UPPET programme, the WB has 
contributed 20 per cent of the programme’s budget ($150 million) through an 
Adjustable Program Loan [APL] to be implemented in three phases over a 10-
year period.  Alongside, external support is also provided by other development 
partners, which includes the African Development Bank (AfDB), German 
Technical Assistance Agency (GTZ, now Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), the Belgian Embassy/Technical Cooperation, Embassy of 
Ireland, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNPF) and the Netherlands Embassy22. The presence of 





political international and national organisations (through embassies, foreign 
affairs ministries, national development agencies, etc.) reinforces Sassen’s 
conclusion that suggested that ‘many governments now see their responsibilities 
going beyond foreign policy as traditionally conceptualized and extending into 
world trade, the global environment and global economic stability’ (2000, p. 
383).  
 
[Insert Network 4 around here] 
 
In 2010, the IFC, in partnership with the AfDB, launched the Africa Schools 
Uganda Program ‘to support improvements to private secondary and tertiary 
schools in Uganda, while helping thousands of students in the country to access 
high-quality education’23. The plan aims to provide support and advisory service 
to 500 schools across the country, helping them address financial and 
management issues so they can offer improved educational services. Moreover, it 
will also facilitate access to financial resources through local commercial banks, 
such us Diamond Trust Bank, DFCU, and Bank of Africa. 
 
On the delivery side, the number of private educational providers has increased 
rapidly since the initial phases of the enactment of the UPPET programme.  In 
2008, Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Sports created the Private 
Schools and Institutions department to oversee ‘the vibrant and ever expanding 
private investment in education’24. To date, according to the department’s 
website25, the number of private secondary schools (over 4000) is more than 
double the number of public schools in the country. The profile of the former 
varies dramatically in terms of their motto (confessional/secular character), 
organisational structure (single/chains of schools), and economic rational 
(for/not-for profit). One of the biggest providers that currently operate in 
Uganda is PEAS (Promoting Equality in African Schools), a UK-registered charity 
that runs a chain of 24 secondary schools in Uganda in a not-for-profit basis. 
PEAS, once again, counts with a broad network of partners (see Network 3). 
The charity’s school model, labelled as “SmartAid Schools in Africa”, is based on 
the principle of ‘self-sustainability’ and each of their schools aim to become 
financially independent from any source of external funding from the moment in 
which they are opened: 
 
PEAS UK fundraises to launch a secondary school, allowing it to open debt 
free. Then, a combination of subsidies from pioneering public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) with the Ugandan and Zambian government, 
boarding school fees and school farms, mean that within two years, the 
school itself will generate enough revenue to cover its running costs, 
including teacher salaries, indefinitely.26 











The charitable company has offices in London (UK), Kampala (Uganda) and 
Ndola (Zambia) and they have been closely involved with the Ugandan 
government in the design and development of the PPP scheme since its 
inception27.  
 
More recently, new developments on the UPPET programme, which under the 
influence of the WB was expanded to all private schools including for-profit 
ventures (see Brans, 2011), has called the attention of new players and edu-
businesses. For instance, in February 2015 Bridge International Academies 
opened seven schools in Uganda. The company operates in a diametrically 
opposed fashion than PEAS. Bridge defines itself as ‘the world’s largest education 
innovation company’28. They operate in a for-profit basis and their rational is 
clear: 
 
We are data-driven and technology-enabled. Using smartphones and 
tablets, our “closed loop” Learning Lab enables us to monitor teacher and 
student performance in real time, constantly reviewing and revising to 
ensure that we are offering a world class education that will prepare our 
students for the 21st century. 29 
 
BIA opened its first school in Nairobi (Kenya) in 2009. To date, the company runs 
414 schools in three different countries (Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda) and is 
preparing to expand in India in the near future. Amongst its main investors there 
are a number of individuals (e.g. Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg); venture 
capital firms (Khosla Ventures; NEA; NOVASTAR; PanAfrican Invesment Co.); 
edu-businesses (Learn Capital [part of Pearson PLC]; RethinkEducation); 
philanthropic organisations (Omidyar Network) international organisations 
(IFC) and also national government agencies (UK Department for International 
Development [DfID]; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC], the US 
government’s development finance institution). 
 
Finally, in 2011 the Ugandan National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) 
hired Cambridge Education to develop the Secondary Education Curricula, 
Assessment and Examinations Reform (CURASSE)30. The activities to be 
performed by the company during the 40-month duration of the contract 
included: writing the curriculum; developing teaching and learning materials, 
examinations and assessment reforms; and creating a teacher support 
programme31. Cambridge Education is a ‘global education services company’32, 
part of the Mott MacDonald Ltd. (a global independent education, health, 
management and construction consultancy). The company is involved in a 
                                                        
27 Research interview conducted with John Rendell, CEO of PEAS. 
28 http://www.bridgeinternationalacademies.com/company/about/  





32 https://www.camb-ed.co.uk/Aboutus.aspx  
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number of activities with partners in the UK and abroad, such as: public and 
private schools (including a number of English academies mentioned above in 
policy framework 1), local authorities, public sector agencies, governments, etc.  
 
The examples shown above are evidence of the causal power of network 
relationships. This final policy framework case indicates ways in which states, or, 
at least, sections within them, are re-formed in a political landscape that takes 
the shape of networked configurations within which the government is one 
amongst many other players. This mode of governance could be understood as 
“governing within networks”. Following the logic of ‘creative capitalism’, such 
foundational processes are designed and shared by different actors, which will 
interact in a networked ways creating agreements but also through conflicting 
negotiation processes. This resembles what Rhodes understood as ‘the 
differentiated polity with no single centre’ (1988, p. 1). Here, the government is 
possibly the initiator of such processes but not necessarily the main regulator of 




In this paper, I have begun to sketch a conceptual model that aims to facilitate 
the analysis of what could be understood as processes of “network governance in 
action”. Börzel (1997, p. 15) concludes by arguing that there is a need to not only 
show that policy networks exist but also that they are relevant. Following that 
idea, the present is the beginning of an effort to conceptualise the changing, 
multiple, clashing and, at times, incoherent roles that different players exert 
throughout them. Here I have focused on the role of governments in three 
initially identified “policy frameworks” (network as a policy technology; network 
as a policy actor; and network as a state-maker), which corresponds with three 
different modes of governance (governing through networks; governing 
with/alongside networks; governing within networks). All three frameworks 
also represent examples of what could be understood as processes of 
repopulation of the state. The new roles and positions of governments within 
and across policy networks highlight the need to rethink the structure and 
composition of the state and the role that, in the past, were considered as ‘non-
state’ actors play in the reconfiguration of the public sphere. 
 
In fact, network configurations are complex and differ both structurally and 
semantically. Policy networks are considered as one kind of new global “social” 
(Ball & Olmedo, 2012), where new voices are given space within policy talk. By 
enabling global social, political and economic connections, these become key 
players spaces in the fields of social and education policy (Ball, 2012). They 
constitute policy communities, usually based upon shared conceptions of social 
problems and their solutions. However, far from having created a more 
democratic environment where horizontal relationships facilitate an 
environment where multiple voices are considered and different collectives are 
able to participate in equal conditions in policy-making processes (Sørensen & 
Torfing, 2007), new vertical and hierarchical relationships are established and 
power imbalances based on the control of resources (physical, political, 
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economic, social and technological) by certain actors within the networks 
privilege certain interests and perspectives and maginalise others.  
 
Finally, the processes of identification, access and analysis of those networked 
policy frameworks stress the need to reconsider and rethink the ways in which 
we approach traditional variables in the field of education policy and 
international development. Policies, events, actors and programmes seem to be 
both fixed in geographical locations as well as in constant movement and 
transformation throughout new policy spaces. I am not suggesting here a naïve 
reference to the global/local nature of policy, or a flat understanding of 
processes of policy borrowing and policy mobilities. On the contrary, the analysis 
above stresses the complexity of such processes, as they are taking place 
simultaneously in virtual spaces and on physical locations “on the ground”. It is 
impossible to explain the political decisions and their effects in the Global South, 
for instance, without making a straight reference to other ongoing efforts in 
other parts of the world or other areas of social, economic and political activity 
within those same locations. As Dicken and his colleagues suggest, “there exists, 
then, a particular constellation of power relations implicit in any understanding 
of the global economy” (2001, p. 90). But such constellations can only be mapped 
and understood (if at all possible) through the everyday practices (meetings, 
contracts, agreements, statements, informal conversations, email exchanges, 
etc.) and spaces (meeting rooms and offices, corridors, conferences, airports, 
restaurants, etc.) in which they take place. All those take place concurrently and 
instantaneously. Politicians, investors, philanthropists, practitioners, etc., read 
and answer emails while attending events; make decisions, develop new ideas, 
and change their minds while having conversations both with experts in their 
fields and/or while having a random conversation during a meal or while 
waiting to board a plane; or think about themselves and what to do next while 
looking for the right words when writing about their activities in multiple social 
media sites. But, once again, this might sound like an old mantra that reminisces 
the power of mysterious ‘butterfly effects’ in policy analysis. It is here where the 
tedious exercise of triangulating information in newspaper articles, pursuing 
every link on a website, interrogating diaries and passports, setting up Twitter 
alerts and following people and companies on Facebook, just to mention only a 
few of the multiple tasks that are involved in reconstructing policy networks, 
could shed some light on the analysis of what, following Peck and Theodore 
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